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Secret-key security
• A key is chosen random and kept secret • Given oracle access, an adversary tries to recover the key or distinguish from random permutation • Introduced by Knudsen and Rijmen [AC2007] 7R AES, 7R Feistel • Mendel et al. [SAC2009] 7R AES • Minier et al. [Africacrypt 2009] Rijndael • Gilbert and Peyrin [FSE2010] 8R AES • Bouillaguet et al. [SAC2010] Generalized Feistel • Sasaki [IWSEC 2010] Rijndael • Nikolic et al. [ICISC 2010] several ciphers • Minier et al. [FSE 2011] Generalized • Our new attack: 11R Feistel • Difference in round functions -AC2007 assumed key xor followed by an arbitrary function -We assume key xor followed by an SP Concluding remarks
• The case of 64bit block with 8-bit Sboxes can also be analyzed (but # of rounds has to be reduced) • Restrictions of "good" S-boxes and of MDS matrix are not quite mandatory for the attack to work • Future work: application to actual ciphers
